


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JPRS 80965

2 June 1982



USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1259

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INTERNATIONAL

U.S. POLICIES THREATEN ALLIES' ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 82 p 6

[Article by S. Men'shikov, doctor of economic sciences: "How America Suffocates Her Allies"]

[Text] In the recent past the economic contradictions between the United States and her greatest competitors have attained a high degree of intensity. In all basic spheres--trade, foreign exchange relations, credit and financial policy, and the struggle for raw material--one bitter battle is fought after another. There is not an important economic question on which the position of the Western powers would not disagree. Speaking about the constant aggravation of these conflicts, the London FINANCIAL TIMES was forced to state: "It is still early to speak of something on the order of a full-scale crisis, but the course of events contains all elements necessary for the further deterioration of relations."

Imperialist competition is not a new thing. The fight between the monopolies for the economic redivision of the world is one of the bases of the contemporary capitalist order. But now an unusual intensity of the struggle is present, an expansion of its front. What is concealed behind this?

First of all, the changed correlation of forces between the main capitalist powers. Taken together, Western Europe and Japan are now producing a significantly larger industrial output than the United States, while still 15-20 years ago they produced by far less than she did. During the last third of the century, the share of the United States in the total export of goods of the capitalist world fell from one third to one eighth, while the share of Western Europe and Japan increased from 29 to 55 percent. The American monopolies are embittered by their defeats in the battle of competition and are trying to organize a global counterattack.

Secondly, the growth of imperialist competition is taking place in conditions of a new economic crisis when the partners of the United States not only do not wish, but also do not have the possibility to retreat before American pressure. Neither the interests of preserving their own profits, nor the intensification of their internal social contradictions allow them to do this. The chief economist of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, S. Ostri warns: "It is highly improbable that in the more or less foreseeable future we will become witnesses of any perceptible reduction of unemployment in Europe. The picture is, indeed, dismal."

But Washington does not want to take into consideration the problems of its allies. Precisely the present moment they considered convenient there for the implementation of a new strategy, consisting in the weakening and suppression of the independence of the partners along all lines: Military, political and economic. In the economic sphere there has been, above all, an intensification of the traditional methods of trade war. Accusing her competitors of dumping (the sale of goods at prices below value), the United States herself subsidizes the export of American goods on a wide scale. Loudly reproaching its allies for protectionism, the American government at the same time increased the customs and other barriers to the import of foreign goods into the United States. Moreover, protectionism is openly and shamelessly used as an offensive weapon. Thus, the minister of trade of the United States, Baldrige, not long ago point-blank threatened Japan that, if she does not open her market to American exports, the government of the United States "cannot hold back its protectionism" with Japan "sustaining greater losses in a trade war than the United States."

No less sharp are the fights between the American and the West European monopolies. A brutal fight is taking place over steel, textiles, chemical products, agricultural products, in the sphere of civil aviation, commercial shipping, communications, banking and insurance affairs. Moreover, the United States makes wide use of trans-oceanic concerns as internal competition among the West European countries themselves, as well as their contradictions with Japan.

Deep anxiety in connection with the situation being created, for example, was manifested clearly in the recent article of the minister of foreign affairs of the FRG, Genscher, published in the Paris FIGARO: "Europe is going through a difficult and deep structural crisis. More than 10 million unemployed, the stagnation of economic growth, large trade deficits in relation to two other large industrial powers--Japan and the United States--all these things are a sign of the increasing reduction in the ability of European industry to compete. Europe is running the risk of becoming a secondary industrial region."

Special concern among the partners of the United States is called forth by the aspiration of the Reagan Administration to make use of the arms race that has returned on the other side of the ocean and the policy of increasing international tension which has been set there against her competitors. The method of the oppression of competitors is clearly seen in the sphere of currency-financial and credit policy. Not long ago the American President submitted the new budget of the United States to the Congress--a budget that envisages a significant increase in the state deficit. The main reason is the inflation of military expenditures against the background of a slump of the economy. This induced the countries of the "Common Market" to their emissary to Washington to ask for an immediate change in the economic policy of the United States.

The point is that the growing deficit of the American budget threatens Western Europe with new troubles. First of all, this leads to an increase in inflation and to higher interest rates for loans. Such a policy makes it impossible for the governments of Western Europe to stimulate their own economy by means of cheap credit. It threatens a new reduction in the exchange rates of the West European currencies in relation to the dollar, and thereby a significant rise in the price of

oil, raw material and other imported goods. In other words, the policy of the Reagan Administration of forcing military expenditures turns for Europe into the export of the crisis and inflation from the United States to Europe.

Leaders of the governments of U. S. allies have been compelled to come forward with a critique of such a policy. Chancellor of the FRG, H. Schmidt, for example, declared already in January that, if there is no change in the policy of the United States, the West risks moving into an economic depression similar to the crisis of the 1930's. In February Schmidt repeated this statement, directly linking the question of economic problems with the military plans of the United States. The same idea the West German chancellor developed in an interview with the Dutch newspaper HAAGSCHE COURANT.

French state leaders have expressed themselves still more sharply on this question in the recent past. Assessing the foreign exchange-financial policy of the United States, C. Cheysson, the minister of external relations of France, declared: "The Americans, judging by everything, do not in the least ponder the consequences of their foreign exchange policy for our Western community. . . . We may hold out, but not ad infinitum. There comes the moment when the slowdown in economic growth rates, the shortage of capital investments, and the growth of unemployment, like a torrent, sweep away everyone." And the French minister of foreign trade, M. Jobert, accused the United States directly of having caused "an enormous inflation in the world community."

Even the reserved British and the polite Japanese have joined the chorus of Washington's critics. The English minister of finance, Howe, on instructions of M. Thatcher, brought to the notice of the United States the concern of London over the American policy. The prime minister of Japan, Z. Suzuki, reproached the Reagan Administration with the fact that it is trying to solve its own problems at the expense of its partners, including Japan.

In the opinion of Western observers, the foreign exchange contradictions will inevitably become a subject of discussion at the new meeting of the heads of the governments of the Western powers on economic questions which is planned for June. They recall that at an analogous meeting during the past year Reagan rejected the criticism of his allies. They imply that this time he will not succeed in getting away unscathed.

Another method of weakening the competitors is the direct imposition of a new round of the arms race by the Americans on their partners. The military expenditures of the NATO countries are high enough. But the "hawks" on the other side of the ocean demand more. With this goal in mind, they, in particular, stubbornly defend their sinister plans for the placement of American nuclear intermediate range rockets in Western Europe. These plans, which are calculated to obtain military superiority, threaten to undermine European security to its foundations. But their other aspect consists in the fact that they bind the West European countries hand and foot, having drawn them into a permanent and growing process of nuclear "prearmament" by NATO. Washington wants to kill two birds with one stone: To perpetuate its nuclear presence on the European continent and to shift to the European allies the burden of endless rearmament. This is what is really behind the talks on "the restoration" of the balance of power in Europe.

The American strategists have adopted the absolute rule from their own bitter experience: The competitive economic struggle is in the final analysis lost by those who spend exorbitant resources on the arms race. It is precisely this which explains to a considerable extent their desire, come what may, to compel their allies to spend more and more for military purposes. The obvious example is Japan, which Washington is literally forcing to increase its military budget, to join in military-technical "cooperation" with the United States. One of the reasons is to compel Japanese industry, which is causing the American monopolies many worries on the world markets, to work for war. You know, the Japanese are now going around the Americans even in a number of civilian branches of high technology (for example, in electronic computers and semiconductors), and not only in metallurgy and automobile construction. Come what may, to stop this dangerous tendency--this is what the corresponding monopolies demand from the Reagan Administration.

Finally, direct damage is inflicted on the positions of West European and Japanese firms, as L. I. Brezhnev noted, by "the policy of cowboy attacks on international trade and normal economic relations", in particular Washington's demand to join so-called "sanctions" against the Soviet Union and Poland. Of course, here there is a more complicated real state of affairs, the combination of various private interests with the general foreign policy strategy of the United States. Nevertheless, one cannot help but perceive the intention of using "sanctions" for the undermining of the positions of the competitors.

This policy line is most clearly observable in the attempts of the Reagan Administration to wreck the "gas--pipeline" project between the Soviet Union and a number of West European countries. In this question Washington decided to stop at nothing, as it is called, exerting direct pressure on the governments of the FRG, France, Italy, and other countries, threatening private European firms with repressions. Why does Soviet gas not suit Reagan and Weinberger? In words--because it, they say, will increase the dependence of Western Europe on the USSR. But in reality everything is exactly the opposite. The systematic receipt of Siberian gas will allow the West European countries to diversify their sources of energy supply and to weaken the excessive dependence on other sources of supply, including American monopolies. This is what does not suit the United States, which in the course of many years has tried to complicate the energy problem in Western Europe. And here its victim is crawling out of her hands.

The journal FORTUNE not long ago published an article which tells about the multi-billion dollar expenditures of the energy monopolies of the United States for the increase in the export of American coal during the 1980's. It is clear why the representatives of the coal industry warned the government in February to continue to fight against the Yamal-Western Europe Pipeline, which--in the words of the WASHINGTON POST--can "threaten the growth in the export of American coal to Western Europe and inflict damage on the mining industry of the United States, her railways and ports." Out of similar considerations, the American government has tried to wreck the participation of Japanese firms in the development of oil and gas resources on the shelf of Sakhalin jointly with the USSR.

Many people in Western Europe and Japan clearly understand what dangers the new economic strategy of the United States threatens. Resistance to it is increasing in business and official circles. The FRG and France have directly declared that

they will not yield to demands to tear up the contracts for the "gas-pipeline" project. But in Washington they still hope to break the resistance of the partners and rudely twist their arm. There they still do not recognize that they have come too far, that the times of unconditional obedience of allies have passed.

There are in the ruling class of the United States also sober voices warning about the dangers of the policy that has been adopted. As put in the letter of the head of the American Chamber of Commerce, R. Leshner, the policy of the administration "only still further undermines our, as it is, bad international reputation as a commercial partner." Some people among the official figures across the ocean cautiously express apprehensions over the fate of "Atlantic unity". But as a whole, the administration of the United States, priding itself on its concern for the interests of the capitalist class, in pursuit of the chimera of military superiority and "world leadership" remains deaf to the sober assessments of many businessmen and politicians.

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INTERNATIONAL

LENINIST THEORY ON ROLE OF NATIONALISM, RELIGION IN THIRD WORLD OUTLINED

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 82 pp 3-22

[Article by R. A. Ul'yanovskiy: "A Theory Implemented"]

[Excerpts/ III

The Leninist idea of various forms of alliance with national-liberation movements, depending on their nature, assumes a class-type, differentiated attitude toward anti-colonial outbreaks, toward the nationalism of the oppressed nations. V. I. Lenin's thoughts in this regard retain all their importance in our own days, when the scope of the anti-imperialist struggle in the colonial and dependent countries has broadened considerably in connection with the appearance of new revolutionary possibilities in the concluding phase of colonialism's downfall.

First of all, V. I. Lenin warned against the nihilistic attitude toward nationalism which was coming into being on an anti-colonial base, against left-wing attempts to cancel it out, neglecting the historical conformity to principle of its rise and development. V. I. Lenin called for a dealing with anti-imperialist nationalism, for knowing how to support it and cooperate with it, although also acknowledging herein its historical and class-type limited quality as well as its final hostility to communism. "You must base your efforts on that bourgeois nationalism which is being aroused among these peoples, and cannot help but be aroused, and which is historically justified,"¹⁹ he stated in 1919 to the delegates of the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East. More than 60 years have elapsed since these words were said, but Lenin's words are still as topical as they were then. They sober us up from pseudo-revolutionary phrases and arouse in us a critical attitude toward those persons who would like to leap across the stages of historical development which are in conformity with principle.

V. I. Lenin saw the "historical justification" of bourgeois nationalism in the fact that within the oppressed and capitalistically undeveloped nations "there are still /objectively/ common national tasks, to wit, /democratic/ tasks, tasks of /overthrowing the yoke which is foreign to the nation."^{20/} [passages enclosed in slant-lines printed in italics]. Several decades later, enriched by new experience, we can state with confidence that these common national tasks have not been exhausted by the conquest of political independence and the declaration of sovereignty, that they include the step-by-step overcoming of imperialism's influence in international politics, in the national economy, culture, in people's consciousness, etc. It was precisely this which V. I. Lenin had in mind by the phrase "overthrowing the

yoke which is foreign to the nation." The yoke of the imperialist powers did not just boil down to, nor does it now just boil down to, under the conditions of neo-colonialism, a denial of nations' rights to self-determination, although this is its most blatant manifestation. Hence, the anti-imperialist potential of a national movement, in particular, with regard to common national tasks, is still retained for a long time after the formation of an independent state, even though, of course, within the national-liberation movement there is a constantly increasing class differentiation and a class opposition of the forces participating in it.

"In /each/ bourgeois nationalism of an oppressed nation there is a common-democratic contents /against/ the oppression, and it is this contents which we /unconditionally/ support,"²¹ /in italics/, V. I. Lenin wrote in his article entitled "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination." Attention is drawn to the categorical assertion: "in each nationalism of an oppressed nation." It assumes a multiplicity of types of nationalisms in oppressed nations and their distinctions among each other. The Leninist attitude toward the nationalism of an oppressed nation takes into consideration the internal heterogeneity of any form of nationalism, the presence in it of both the common democratic as well as the nationalistically narrow contents which meet the demands of the exploiters. It is a question of supporting not an abstract nationalism in general but only the factors of the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, anti-racist, i. e., common-democratic program within nationalism. But Lenin was prepared to support them in any liberation outbreak against imperialism, even if it took the form of a religious protest. In this connection, V. I. Lenin noted that the "outbreak of a political protest under a religious shell is a phenomenon which is inherent to all peoples at a certain stage of their development."²²

The message sent by V. I. Lenin and M. I. Kalinin to the Afghan emir Amanullah (May 1919) and the subsequent establishment of friendly relations with Afghanistan testified to the readiness to make an alliance even with feudal circles which have proceeded from anti-imperialist, patriotic positions under a religious banner in those countries where progressive anti-imperialist forces have not taken shape. When a broader spectrum of such forces is present, the duty of the socialists, as defined by V. I. Lenin, consists in "supporting in the most decisive manner the most revolutionary elements of the bourgeois-democratic national-liberation movements...and to help them rise up,--and, in case they have a revolutionary war-- /against/ /in italics/ the imperialist powers which are oppressing them." ²³

The Leninist concretely historical approach to evaluating the role of nationalism, his thought about the heterogeneity of anti-colonial movements, the nationalism of oppressed nations, and about orientation toward the most evolutionary elements are all topical even in our own day. Recourse to the Leninist heritage helps us to avoid one-sidedness in the question of nationalism. In his article, "A Liberal's Frank Discourse" (July 1914, authorship established in 1970) V. I. Lenin emphasized the following: "We Marxists understand very well that, in addition to nationalist-reactionaries, there are also nationalist-liberals (or national-liberals --such as the Octobrists and the Kadets), and, finally, there are national-democrats as well."²⁴ This was said with regard to Russia, with regard to the nationalism of a dominant nation. Certainly, in the nationalism of an oppressed nation democratic elements manifest themselves more fully and profoundly. The Leninist definition of the types of nationalism was based on the class position of its

bearers. Thus, democratic nationalism in Russia was represented by the peasantry.

V. I. Lenin also used these same class criteria in approaching national movements in the East. "In Asia a mighty democratic movement is everywhere growing, getting broader and stronger. There the bourgeoisie is */still/* */in italics/* proceeding with the common people against the reactionaries,"²⁵ wrote V. I. Lenin. Here is the basis for the approach to bourgeois nationalism. "The principal member of the main social support...of the Asian bourgeoisie, still capable of committing an historically progressive deed, is the peasant," V. I. Lenin considered.²⁶ But, he wrote in an article entitled "China Renewed" (1912), "Chinese liberty was gained by an alliance between the peasant democrats and the liberal bourgeoisie. Will the peasants have the capacity, without being led by the proletariat's party, of maintaining their democratic position */against/* the liberals, who are only waiting for a suitable moment to turn sharply to the right?"²⁷ This, in Lenin's opinion, was the question on which the fate of the Chinese Revolution depended. This is the question on which depend the fates of the present-day national-liberation movements and which rises again and again in every new political crisis in the countries of Asia and Africa: in the absence or the weakness of the working class and a communist party, will the peasantry be able to defend its own revolutionary position, or will its revolutionary thrust rapidly weaken, and will it allow the liberal, national-reformist bourgeoisie to usurp political power?

Every time that we observe in today's Asia and Africa a turning from a revolutionary spirit to national-reformism, from a socialist orientation and a militant anti-colonialism to capitalism and a rapprochement with the imperialist powers, we can state with certainty and without error that the following is the case: the working people have not succeeded in defending their own revolutionary position against the bourgeoisie. Was this not what happened in Egypt, which under Nasser was in the vanguard against colonialism--as a result of the agrarian reform, the nationalism of big Egyptian capital, the liquidation of foreign capital, and the proclamation of the slogans of scientific socialism, but then, under Sadat, was converted into a country where a return to unrestrained development and encouragement of private enterprise, to a policy of "open doors" for foreign capital, a forgetting of socialist ideals, a betrayal of the Arabs' national interests, as well as an alliance with American imperialism and Zionism became state policy? Nasser's anti-imperialist nationalism was replaced by Sadat's reactionary, pro-imperialist nationalism. And this occurred because of a complete loss of vigilance on the part of the Egyptian anti-imperialist democracy to the rise and rapid development of a bureaucratic stratum, particularly that of the military-bureaucratic bourgeoisie, nouveau-riche persons from the petite bourgeoisie, a solid stratum of kulaks, and sabotage of the official apparatus. A party of scientific socialism, capable of heading up the peasant masses, was not formed in Egypt. The inability of Nasser and his closest followers to create a mass, democratic, and effective party force, which could have maintained the country on its chosen progressive path, also played its own, negative role.

V

Under present-day conditions an exceptional diversity of shades of nationalism has manifested itself in the former colonial world. Without laying claim to a precise classification of exhaustive completeness, and excluding overlapping

strata and symbiosis, the following distinctions could be made: the anti-imperialist nationalism of the patriotic strata of the national bourgeoisie; the nationalism of the new, comprador /purchasing ?/, middle-level bourgeoisie; the nationalism of the military and bureaucratic bourgeoisie; the bourgeois nationalism which is openly chauvinistic, great-power-oriented, and anti-Soviet; and the nationalism of the feudal and semi-feudal elements which advocate independence and which, to a certain extent, merges with bourgeois nationalism.

And, finally, the most developed and widespread nationalism is the peasant, petit-bourgeois, i. e., national-democratic nationalism, which has a substantial anti-imperialist value. The national democrats express the interests of the broad, non-proletarian, laboring masses, primarily those of the peasantry and the urban, petit-bourgeois strata. Although its policy is affected by the ambiguity of the petite bourgeoisie, on the whole, the national democrats, and particularly its left, revolutionary-democratic wing, which embodies an orientation in the direction of socialism, have taken up anti-imperialist positions.

On another level we must take note of an ugly and at times even dreadful phenomenon -- nationalism as a product of the rebirth and disintegration of separate detachments of the communist movement, anti-communism and anti-Sovietism concealing itself under the banner of Marxism. V. I. Lenin clashed with the reborn leaders of the Second International. As is known, this rebirth led to the transformation of the social democracy into social reformism, to the split-up of the labor movement, to the conversion of once-revolutionary parties to counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet positions. We are now observing new and even worse forms of conversion from communist positions to nationalist ones. Such is the essence of Maoism and the attempts to modernize it by the present-day leadership of the CCP.

Despite all the differences between Maoism and the right-wing rebirth of European social democracy, we cannot fail to note certain common traits in their evolution. In both places there has occurred a turning from Marxism to chauvinism, and, as a result of this, there has appeared in both instances a split in the communist and labor movement. The conversion of the CCP leadership to positions of militant nationalism has brought after it a departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the parties of a number of Eastern countries (Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines). The line taken by the present-day CCP leadership represents a naked, adventuristic, provocative nationalism, consciously forming a bloc with imperialism and the reactionaries throughout the world, and proceeding to undermine the unity of the present day's revolutionary forces.

Such is Maoist nationalism, openly and fully hostile to the working class, a result of a betrayal of socialism and of ideological rebirth, deserving to be exposed and scorned, and requiring to be fought against with a constant determination and uncompromisingly.

But there also exist many forms and shadings of that nationalism which, to use V. I. Lenin's words, is historically justified. We must not fail to take it into account. It arises in those regions where the question of liberation from imperialism has not yet been resolved, and not just political but also economic imperialism, liberation from racism and neo-colonialism. The attitude toward it must be determined primarily by the presence in it of a democratic, anti-imperialist

potential. We must take into consideration its strength, dissemination, and the attitude of the popular masses to it. The movement of non-alignment and struggle for a new economic order in the world constitutes the most active and effective form of this democratic, anti-imperialist nationalism, and millions of persons, oppressed by international imperialism, are taking part in it.

This is an objective phenomenon, a stage conforming to principle within most liberated countries at the present time. Precisely in order to break away the broad strata of workers, peasantry, the petite urban bourgeoisie, which comprise a mighty reserve and a reliable support for the revolutionary movement, from the most progressive, consistently anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist trends, the bourgeois propaganda and the members of the reactionary, chauvinist circles are inputting in the popular masses the thought of the inadmissibility of united actions between the followers of Marxism-Leninism and those of the democratic, anti-imperialist nationalism. This is one of the most important components of the strategy of anti-communism in the developing countries, and, in order to counter it, we must bear in mind the Leninist directives--to manifest the maximum care, sensitivity, and benevolence with regard to national and religious traditions, to have the capability of revealing in the nationalism of the oppressed nations the common democratic contents against foreign political and economic oppression and to oppose its chauvinism.

V. I. Lenin's position concerning the duality of nationalism is as topical now as it ever was. In actual political life Marxist-Leninists strive to accurately perceive the various shadings of nationalism, as determined by social, ethnic, religious, and regional conditions of its manifestation. But the main thing is to take into consideration the two tendencies of nationalism, the progressive and the reactionary, and to conduct a tactical line whereby the former is supported in the over-all struggle against imperialism, while the latter is exposed as pro-imperialist, neo-colonialist, and chauvinist, and should be fought irreconcilably.

We have spoken above about the forms in which nationalism manifests itself in connection with its social nature, its two main trends. But what a rich palette of regional, political, and ideological shades contemporary nationalism has if we regard it on a subjective-political level! During the past decade alone the following have appeared on the political stage: the already-mentioned, pro-imperialist, comprador nationalism of Sadat; the nationalism of the Arabian oil-rich states, which has already demonstrated a certain limited capacity to defend national interests against imperialism and to resist the American-Israeli-Egyptian pact; the nationalism of Tshombe, chauvinistic, with an over-done mania for personal greatness, called upon to mask the obvious bankruptcy of his domestic and foreign policies; the closely related by domestic powerlessness, grotesque nationalism of the Central African emperor-for-a-day, Bokassa, to whom not even Napoleon's laurels gave peace; the boastful but, as in the last two instances scarcely harmless nationalism of Idi Amin in Uganda, who had recourse for the increase of his own power to the implantation of a cult of naked force, but which, nonetheless, even in this was capable at times of anti-imperialist thrusts; and along with these--the restrained nationalism of J. Nyerere, permeated with the spirit of anti-imperialism, a striving to draw close to the principles of internationalism and rendering aid to the struggling peoples of the southern part of Africa.

Finally, the most important phenomenon of present times in Asia and Africa--the revolutionary potential of the national democrats standing in the vanguard of the struggle of many peoples of Asia and Africa against imperialism and proceeding to draw closer to scientific socialism. From among their ranks have issued revolutionary-democratic organizations, which are gradually discarding the old, outmoded "clothing" of petit-bourgeois nationalism, drawing closer to internationalism and scientific socialism, and hence are rightfully becoming the vanguard parties of their own people, leading them onto the path of building a socialist society. These are only a few examples of the contradictory manifestation of nationalism under present-day conditions.

VI

Let's take the Iranian Revolution for example. Basically, of course, this is genuinely popular-political and, to a less degree, social. It was conducted under the slogans of the revival of Islamic principles, the affirmations of justice and equality, as these are understood by Islam, under the leadership of the Shi'ite clergy, but it took on a truly popular, anti-monarchist, anti-imperialist nature. It became one of the most important revolutionary upheavals in the Middle East during the past decade, directed against the Shah's monarchy and the U.S. imperialism which was supporting it. How did it happen that the bearers of religious wisdom, and there are approximately 300,000 such persons, came to head up the masses, what circumstances conditioned the furious revolutionary potential of militantly religious nationalism under the banner of Islam?

Iran had long been a complex bundle of political and social unhappiness in which were interwoven an acute dissatisfaction with the foreign, imperialist domination over the destiny of this ancient state and internal, constantly growing social contradictions, a protest of the toiling masses against the feudal and bourgeois upper strata, which had become welded together with foreign capital both in the economy and in politics. At the beginning of the 1950's this dissatisfaction spilled over into a broad, popular movement for the nationalization of the foreign oil companies, which essentially overthrew the Pahlevi Dynasty. Only the interference of the United States allowed the fruits of this revolution to be abolished, a coup d'etat to be carried out in August 1953, and a return to the throne of the Shah, who had fled from the people's wrath. The extremely active military, political, financial, and economic expansion by the United States, the flooding of the country with 50,000 American specialists, primarily from the military and intelligence services, along with the mobilization of the reaction's domestic forces, permitted the Shah's regime to be stabilized for a certain length of time. This firm support of him was sufficient for a quarter of a century.

From the outside the regime of Mohammed Reza seemed to be flourishing. The oil sales allowed the Shah to spend enormous sums on maintaining the army and the police, to appropriate billions of dollars for his own personal property, and to create a privileged Pretorian-type guard. There was a growth in capitalist forces of production. Certain social changes were even carried out, the so-called "White Revolution," aimed at eradicating the vestiges of feudalism gradually in the rural areas and clearing the soil for capitalist development. The country was transformed into a military and political advanced post of the United States against the Soviet Union as well as in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The Shah

took upon himself the functions of a gendarme--a guardian of the neighboring, reactionary regimes and an armed opponent of the Soviet Union; this answered the interests of imperialism and his own aspirations to hegemony and suppression of revolution in adjacent countries. But behind the imposing facade of the Shah's regime were concealed ever-growing and ripening contradictions. The stormy growth of capitalist accumulation ruined masses of artisans and peasants and impelled millions of persons to leave their villages. The cities became over-filled with poor people. At the same time there was an unrestrained increase of wealth among the merchants, officials, and the new bourgeoisie; corruption became a common national vice.

Linked with the "White Revolution," the attraction of foreign capital on a mass scale, largely as the bearer of advanced technology, led to the rise of a new source of dissatisfaction. The national bourgeoisie and the strata attached to it began to sense their own lack of equal rights, their subordinate position in relation to foreign capital, for whom the Shah's regime, seeing in it their own support, had created most favorable conditions.

The activation of popular outbreaks and the growth of indignation was answered by the Shah with an increase of the repressions, a further tightening of the screws, as carried out by the military-police apparatus. The country was dominated by the Shah's secret police, the Savak, which can only be compared to the fascist Gestapo; it hunted down all opponents of the regime and was merciless. Thousands and tens of thousands of persons, particularly democrats and communists, languished in prisons, were subjected to torture and execution. In March 1975 the Shah banned all political parties and decreed the creation of the so-called "Party of National Rebirth."

Having placed his bets on the army, the punitive organs, and foreign aid, striving to modernize Iranian society with the help of bayonets and by the introduction of modern technology, the Shah had a hostile attitude toward national customs and traditions. He was also impelled in this direction by the circumstance that the leaders of the dominant religious community, the Shi'ites, which encompassed 90 percent of the population, had never recognized the Pahlevi Dynasty. They regarded it as a usurper who had seized power in 1921 and had maintained it by force and deceit. Self-confident, relying on the privileged military caste, on billions of plundered dollars, on universal bribery, and on the cruelty of the punitive organs, the Shah did not even attempt to normalize relations with the representatives of the Muslim religious cult, which enjoyed enormous influence among the masses. He strove to crowd out Islamic, Iranian nationalism by intensively propagandizing the greatness of pre-Islamic Iran. In 1976 he abolished the Muslim calendar and introduced a new way of counting the years, proceeding from the founder of the Akhemenid Dynasty, the Persian Emperor Cyrus. Other measures were also promulgated, objectively aimed at subverting Islamic traditions and the role and influence of the Shi'ite clergy.

A rare, exceptional situation took shape in Iran. The Shah and his entourage were not in a position to utilize the Muslim religion and the principal part of the Shi'ite clergy as an instrument for shoring up their own despotic power. They were rather afraid of the Muslim clergy and did not dare to proceed against it openly, to apply those extremely harsh repressive measures which they were using

against the regime's secular opponents. But the half-measures to which the Shah had recourse in order to crowd out the Shi'ite traditions only exacerbated the struggle between the clergy and the Shah's authority.

Many Shi'ite clergymen were from the common people, sons of poor artisans, hawkers, peddlers, low-level officials, schoolteachers, and merchants, who were able, by scrimping and saving, to obtain a religious education. They lived among the common people and knew their needs and hardships; they shared the social aspirations of the simple Iranians, their dreams of equality and justice. These motifs resounded in their preachings in the mosques. Under the conditions of the extremely harsh police terror, when hundreds and thousands of progressive representatives of the workers, the intelligentsia, and even the democratically minded officers were executed or thrown into prisons, when open political struggle was banned, when those activists of the heroic People's Party of Iran who had escaped execution languished in prison for decades, the Muslim religion (Shi'ism) became the only possible form of anti-Shah opposition, a certain kind of autonomous, political force, anti-imperialist and anti-despotic in its thrust, reflecting the attitude of the broadest popular masses toward the Shah's regime.

Once, at the turn of the Middle Ages into modern times, during the Age of the Reformation in Europe, popular, anti-feudal movements proceeded under the banner of religion. It was long ago that Europe passed through this period. But in the East the Middle Ages are nearer at hand, they have still not entirely become history, they are still predominant in the consciousness of the popular masses, and hence supply ideological and emotional nourishment for their advocacy of profoundly modern, bourgeois-democratic, anti-imperialist demands. In not a single Eastern country has the liberation struggle managed to get by without religious slogans. In Iran the Shi'ite clergy not only raised the banner of the movement but also became its organizing force.

Rolling throughout Iran during the summer and autumn of 1978 was a new, menacing wave of strikes, protest demonstrations, and mass manifestations demanding the deposition of the monarch. The latter directed his army against the people, but the days of the dynasty were numbered; on 16 January 1979 the Shah fled from Teheran.

The Ayatollah Khomeini played an outstanding role in the Iranian Revolution. This 83-year-old Muslim theologian was able, on the one hand, to become a symbol, and, on the other hand, to consolidate into an integrated national front the most diverse, sometimes simply class-opposed, elements--the middle-level bourgeoisie, artisans and petty tradesmen, considerable portions of the factory-plant proletariat, students, and peasants, comprising, when taken together, an absolute majority of the country's population, and all this on a revolutionary, anti-monarchist, and anti-American base in the form of a universal religious protest, spilling over into an open and thoroughgoing revolution.

Khomeini's platform was characterized by implacability in the struggle to overthrow the Shah and eliminate all remnants of the police regime, a course aimed at rooting out a dependence on imperialism. Along with this, he succeeded in expressing in a unique form, permeated with Islamic traditions and hence accessible, the aspirations of the oppressed classes for a change in the social structure, to a cessation of the plundering of the people by foreigners, big landowners, and

capitalists, to raising the living standards of common people, and to affirming their dignity. Moreover, all the radical demands have been clothed by him in the form of a rebirth of the historically excellent Islamic values. There is no need to demonstrate the obvious Utopian nature of Islam's social slogans. Over the course of its almost 1500-year history Islam's social appeals and slogans, like those of all the other religions, have served, in the final analysis, as a means of reconciling the popular masses to a gloomy reality; they have objectively masked usurious, feudal, and capitalist exploitation.

Of course, the politicization of Islam in Iran has been extremely contradictory. Many of its conservative leaders have spoken out against socialism, deeming it to be just as hostile to Iran as imperialism. This finds expression in the common slogan which the Islamic ideologists, especially during the initial period of the Revolution, preached in Iran: "neither the West nor the East!". Under such conditions the consistently revolutionary forces of Iran cannot consider the revolutionary gains as guaranteed or irreversible, cannot rely on the formation of favorable conditions, all the more so in that after the passage of the first few years of the Iranian Revolution, having accomplished its radical, political turn, it slowed down its own further development and halted before the necessity of a social revolution, before the task of a decisive upswing in the social and economic level of the people's life, particularly that of the entire working class and the peasantry. Substantial changes have not occurred in the position of these classes.

In the Iranian Revolution, which united the entire people at the stage of overthrowing the Shah's dictatorship, there have now appeared two currents, two tendencies: the radical, popular and the liberal, bourgeois. The working people of the city and the village, workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and the petite bourgeoisie are fighting for the decisive and complete annihilation of the military-police despotism and the dependence upon imperialism; they are for the step-by-step democratization of the social and political structure, for socio-economic changes, for improving the lives of the workers and peasants. But the big capitalists, the bourgeois strata of the population claim leadership participation in running the country and equitable relations with international capitalists. They are satisfied with doing away with the excesses of the Shah's autocracy; they advocate the introduction of a bourgeois, constitutional regime, improved conditions of inter-action with foreign capital and the largest imperialist powers of the West, primarily with the United States. They are interested not only in retaining the capitalist structure but also in cooperating under new conditions with imperialism in the political and military spheres, for they see in it a guarantee of retaining their own privileges. In the former case it is a matter of developing the revolution and continuing its genuinely popular traditions, of approaching running the country by left-wing, democratic forces, of the gradual transformation of the political revolution through a number of intermediate stages into a social revolution. In the latter case it is a matter of curtailing the revolution, forgetting about its popular, social nature. The former tendency is directed at strengthening the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, anti-monopolist, and anti-capitalist tendencies, the latter--at isolating the genuinely revolutionary forces from power, at twisting Iranian nationalism into a means of alliance with the West.

At the moment of the Shah's overthrow and then the exacerbation of the conflicts with the United States both tendencies were closely integrated, and the liberals had to step back into the shadows, for they understood that the implementation of their limited, class egotistical goals was in the hands of the popular masses, that the revolution was developing precisely thanks to the struggle on the part of the radicals. For a time the radical slogans were predominant; they became, as it were, the common banner of the revolution. But the attainment of the primary goals inevitably led to an exacerbation of the internal contradictions, to a differentiation of the unified, anti-Shah front, and to a re-grouping of forces. The bourgeois liberals, frightened by the popular menace and by the crisis of the private-capitalist national economy, have been leaning more and more toward a "normalization" of relations with the West, toward an activation of anti-communist attitudes, and toward utilizing nationalistic and religious prejudices for these purposes. They have been striving to attract the Ayatollah Khomeini over to their side along with at least a part of his immediate circle of followers. A complex struggle is being waged around Khomeini and around those who are scheduled to take his place eventually.

But taking part in this struggle for the further progressive development of the Iranian Revolution and against the retrogressive movement of religious, anti-imperialist nationalism toward reaction is a powerful force which has been aroused and put into action, to a considerable extent, by the preaching of the Islamic revival. Though nationalistic in its ideology and leadership, the Iranian Revolution was truly popular in its forms. Moreover, despite its obvious limited, primarily petit-bourgeois, nationalistic nature, the Iranian Revolution has demonstrated the application of mass revolutionary methods of struggle. The Iranian Revolution has known the full fury of demonstrations by many millions of persons drawn from the entire nation, against which the American-trained army and gendarmes of the Shah proved to be powerless. The Iranian Revolution had recourse to specifically proletarian methods of struggle--general strikes which lasted for months--such as, for example, the general strike of the petroleum workers, which fundamentally undermined the Shah's economic and political positions. And, finally, the Iranian Revolution has known the armed uprising of the urban outskirts: the poor, the workers, the students, the revolutionary youth, which in the course of two or three days led to the complete demoralization and disintegration of the well-equipped army of the Shah, an army which had been created during the course of decades and which had been trained by American instructors.

"The revolution in Iran has a special nature," said L. I. Brezhnev in the Accountability Report of the CPSU CC at the 26th Party Congress, "and it has become a major event in international life in recent years. Despite all its complexity and contradictory qualities, this is basically an anti-imperialist revolution, although domestic and foreign reactionaries are attempting to change this quality."³³

The mass revolutionary methods of struggle by the Iranian working people have not passed without leaving traces. The liberal bourgeoisie, while taking advantage of their results, is attempting to commit them to oblivion, but this is not so simple to accomplish. The laboring masses have come to believe in their own strength and have acquired experience in independently solving political problems. This is a powerful factor in favor of developing popular, plebian tendencies in the Iranian Revolution and a pledge of its future, albeit, perhaps, not soon and, certainly not easy victories.

Less than a year before the revolution in Iran, on 27 April 1978, the Afghan Revolution occurred. It was national-democratic in nature and was headed up by the National-Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which had been formed in 1963. From its very beginning the revolution profoundly affected the country's social structure--it abolished feudal and semi-feudal land ownership, usury; it advanced to the foreground the tasks of eliminating the almost general illiteracy, the emancipation of women, etc.

If in Iran the Islamic clergy up to this time has succeeded in being at the head of the anti-imperialist revolution, in neighboring Afghanistan a considerable portion of the Islamic clergy facilitated the rallying of the reactionary forces which took up arms against the Afghan democrats. These forces receive continuous support from U. S. imperialism, Chinese hegemonists, the Pakistani military clique, and conservative Arab regimes in their struggle against the people's regime. Nationalism, particularly religious nationalism, is historically always concrete. It is bourgeois or feudal but always multi-faceted. And here in the given case we have before us the two faces of nationalism. What wide differences there are between them! How primitive and vulgar are the attempts by the reactionary circles of Iran, Afghanistan, and the imperialist ideologists to present matters as if the struggle which is being waged by reactionary Afghan groups against the people's regime under the false banner of Islam has, supposedly, the same nature as the democratic, anti-imperialist Islamic movement in Iran. This identification is being done in order to influence the foreign-policy course of the Iranian Revolution, to weaken its anti-imperialism and to impart an anti-communist thrust to it.

In Iran and Afghanistan at the given stage of the revolution's development in both countries the varied thrust of Islamic nationalism may be ascertained. "Under the banner of Islam," L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "a liberation struggle can be unleashed. This is testified to by the experience of history, including the most recent history. But it also testifies that Islamic slogans can likewise be used by reactionaries in stirring up counter-revolutionary insurgencies. Consequently, the entire matter boils down to a question of what the real contents of this or that movement are."⁴

Such is the complexity of the phenomena of contemporary nationalism. It can become an implacable, deadly foe of imperialism, but also fanatic, without any pity for working people who have risen up to take part in a social struggle. It is impossible to overlook the fact that in most of the countries of Asia and Africa nationalism has remained a major ideological-political force; the broad masses are still marching behind it. The left-wing democratic circles have no other choice but to approach nationalism in all its concreteness, to utilize its anti-imperialist, democratic, and revolutionary potential to the hilt, to strive to prevent it from turning to reaction, and thereby to broaden the possibilities of cooperating with it in the interests of consolidating national independence and the ensuing struggle for social progress, while never forgetting its ambiguous nature. If the thesis of the enhanced role of reactionary elements within bourgeois and feudal nationalism as the social contradictions become more exacerbated is correct in principle, then we must not let pass unnoticed the fact that the democratic contents of the nationalism of the politically oppressed or economically exploited strata, classes, nationalities, tribes, and nations in the liberated states is being manifested with new force during the period of crisis of the neo-colonial system of present-day imperialism. Both tendencies must be taken into consideration--to be

more exact, all the tendencies--and to determine concretely which of them is predominant in the given phase, where it is leading, what struggle is being waged among them, which classes are advocating these tendencies, and what are the possible prospects for their development.

VII

V. I. Lenin strongly urged support by communists of democratic, anti-imperialist movements; he saw this as their unconditional duty. But he warned against the absorption of even the rudimentary forms of socialist awareness by nationalism, against being dissolved in it, losing one's own identity, and forgetting the provisional and limited nature of an alliance with democratic nationalism. V. I. Lenin saw a guarantee against these phenomena in the preservation by the communist movement of its own ideological and organizational independence and purity. At the Second Comintern Congress V. I. Lenin set forth the thesis that the working class ought to struggle "in a provisional alliance with the bourgeois democrats of the colonies and backward countries but not merge with them; and they should unconditional preserve the independence of the proletarian movement even in its most rudimentary form."³⁵ And this has remained correct with a complete understanding of the difficulties which have been encountered and continue to be encountered by the formation of the communist movement in backward, semi-colonial or pre-capitalistic societies. In 1920 V. I. Lenin stated that proletarian parties, "if they can emerge in such countries at all," will be able to conduct communist tactics and policies only by being in definite relationships with the peasant movement,³⁶ i. e., by taking all measures to support the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist peasant movement. Thus, the very possibility of creating proletarian parties in the Eastern countries at that time seemed quite problematical to Lenin.

These difficulties have not been overcome even down to our own times. The low numbers of people in the working class, its youth, bearing in mind that, as a rule, most of the people engaged in hired labor comprise workers of the first or second generation. They have not yet completely broken away from the land and from the peasant, farm economy; they are still subjected to the very powerful influence of religion, the tribal and caste system, as well as petit-bourgeois attitudes. All these factors serve as objective hindrances to the formation of mass proletarian parties and organizations. That is why in many former colonial countries to this day there are no experienced, authoritative, influential communist parties which have become significant forces in political life.

But V. I. Lenin called for the protection of the independence of even the tenderest young shoots of the communist movement, believing in their enormous potential in the plan for the future development of the revolutionary process, and attributing to them a particular function, going beyond the framework of the bourgeois-democratic, national-liberation movement. V. I. Lenin assigned to them the task of making the transition to socialism not via the route of capitalism but by-passing or interrupting it, for, in contrast to the leaders of the Second International, he was convinced that under the conditions of the incipient, worldwide, socialist revolution, the peoples of the East were not fatally foredoomed to repeat the path of development which had been followed by the European countries, to pass through all the phases of capitalism, that they had received a unique, historical opportunity, by relying on the aid of the victorious socialist revolution, to avoid

completely or to cut short partially the formation of capitalism.

This innovative idea, relying on the foresight of Marx and Engels, took on programmatic importance at the Second Comintern Congress. At that time the victory of the non-capitalist path of development was naturally associated with the leadership of the working class and its vanguard--the Communists. In this form it was implemented for the first time in the national outlying areas of the former tsarist Russia and--beyond its borders--under certain special conditions in the Mongolian People's Republic.

During the 1960's there arose a new variant of development along the path to socialism not by way of capitalism--the socialist orientation of domestic and foreign policy, a non-capitalistic development under the leadership of a revolutionary democracy. But what V. I. Lenin declared 60 years ago, while addressing himself basically to the Communists of the Soviet East, also bears completely on the new possibilities for avoiding capitalism, and it resounds like the advice of our wise contemporary. It is characteristic that all of V. I. Lenin's remarks in this connection were directed against running on ahead too fast, against leftist, pseudo-revolutionary thought.

V. I. Lenin decisively argued against adventuristic proposals about exporting revolution to backward countries (Preobrazhenskiy, Trotskiy). When one of the founders of the communist movement in India, M. N. Roy, well-known for his numerous errors in a polemic with V. I. Lenin concerning strategic problems of the national-liberation movement at the Second Comintern Congress, put forth the idea of a campaign by Indian Muslim emigrants and detachments of border tribes from Soviet Central Asia to India by way of Afghanistan, V. I. Lenin pointed out the incorrectness in principle and the lack of realism in these plans.³⁷

In V. I. Lenin's speeches against Roy the Marxist, objective, restrained approach to the national-liberation movement was revealed in particularly sharp relief in contrast to the left-wing adventurism. Do not force the development of events, do not set forth socialist revolution as a first-priority task, do not assign to weak sources of the communist movement the unrealistic goal of achieving hegemony on a national scale, do not put yourselves in opposition to the anti-imperialist movement being led by the bourgeois democrats, but recognize its conformity to principle, enter into an alliance with it, support its democratic demands, broaden them, know how to operate within the framework of this alliance, increasing one's own influence on the working people, but, withal, having an excellent understanding and a critical sense of the limitations of the bourgeois leadership, defend the class interests of the working people and preserve one's own independence--this was the position taken by V. I. Lenin, and its correctness has been confirmed by the present-day course of the revolutionary process.

V. I. Lenin argued against the mechanical transfer to the Eastern countries of the concepts of socialist revolution and the strategic positions which had been shaped in the West or the uncritical extension of the Soviet experience to them. He called for "our use not of the letter but the spirit, the sense of the lessons gained from experience" by Soviet Russia.³⁸

In the area of socio-economic policy V. I. Lenin recommended that the communists of the backward countries not be too hasty in introducing socialism, manifest the maximum of restraint and caution so as not to frighten off the waverers, not undermine the trust and understanding of the petit-bourgeois masses, utilize all the possibilities being presented for the economic development by domestic and foreign capitalism. In a letter entitled "To the Communist Comrades of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan, and the Gorskaya Republic" (April 1921) V. I. Lenin outlines an economic and social program of non-capitalist development, having universal importance and warning against left-wing, pseudo-socialist extremes. In particular, he recommended: "a slower, more careful, more systematic transition to socialism."³⁹

Now those detachments of the communist, labor, and national-liberation movements of Asia and Africa which have consistently advocated a socialist orientation for their own countries, following the path of building the foundations of socialism, have the possibility for the manifold development of political and economic ties and all other, particularly military, forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the entire world socialist community. This is their enormous historical advantage.

"Young states," it is mentioned in the "Decree of the CPSU CC on the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,"--"and, above all, those of them who have chosen a socialist orientation, regard with a lively interest the Soviet experience in building a national-state, the transition of a number of peoples of the USSR to socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage of development."

* * *

Bourgeois propaganda still affirms the disregard on the part of the Communists and Lenin for national and ethnic questions, declaring that for Lenin nationalism (and for the bourgeois political scientist the nationalistic and the national are one and the same thing) was, supposedly, a secondary problem, that he did not consider the nation to be an important historical factor, while socialism and democratic nationalism, as it were, seemed to him to be lying on different, completely incommensurate levels.

Nonetheless, for Lenin the national was always that reality in which the class factor reveals itself in one form or another. Being internationalists, Lenin and the Communists of all countries have struggled and are struggling for a socialist revolution within the framework of a specific nation, under concrete national conditions. Recognition of the unevenness and leap-like form of capitalism's development during the epoch of imperialism and the potential for socialism's victory in one country taken individually, consideration of national conditions and characteristics--this is the most important and mandatory factor for working out the strategy and tactics of the national-liberation and socialist revolution. Regarding the national as the historically given, the objective, Lenin was completely alien to nihilism with respect to it. He called for sensitivity and care, mutual respect, and taking characteristics into consideration in relations among peoples and revolutionary parties. A consistently democratic solution of the national problem was for him one of the tasks of a socialist revolution. But Lenin understood its complexity and length of time required. In practice the national problem has turned out to be lengthier than the class problem. And Lenin foresaw this.

"National antipathies will not disappear so rapidly; hatred--and perfectly legitimate hatred--in an oppressed nation for an oppressor nation /will remain/ for a time; it will disappear only /after/ the victory of socialism and /after/ the final establishment of completely democratic relations among nations,"⁴⁰ he wrote. /passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics/.

V. I. Lenin not only did not regard the national problem and socialism on different, opposite levels, he was the first to see in the resistance to national oppression and colonialism an important ally in the socialist revolution. He proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination as an unshakable principle of the Communist Party. He called for an alliance with national-liberation movements, for support of their thrust against oppression, foreseeing the transition of democratic national movements from the struggle against imperialism to the struggle against capitalist exploitation in general.

Actually, V. I. Lenin approached the national problem not as an absolute, which is inherently true of bourgeois nationalists, but from the viewpoint of the interests of the working class's class struggle and the socialist revolution. He was guided by this principle in both domestic and foreign policy, and this is one of the things which he bequeathed to his followers.

FOOTNOTES

19. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye Sobranie Sochineniy" /Complete Works/, Vol 39, p 330.

20. Ibid., Vol 30, p 111.

21. Ibid., Vol 25, pp 275--276.

22. Ibid., Vol 4, p 228.

23. Ibid., Vol 27, p 261.

24. VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 4, 1970, p 5.

29. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 39, p 329.

30. Ibid., Vol 41, p 243.

31. See Ibid., Vol 43, p 199; Vol 41, p 168.

32. Ibid., Vol 41, p 168.

33. L. I. Brezhnev, "Otchetnyy Doklad TsK KPSS XXVI S"yezdu Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza.../Accountability Report of the CPSU CC to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.../, p 17.

34. Ibid., p 18.

35. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 41, p 167.

36. See Ibid., p 243.

37. See KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1968, pp 39--40.

38. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 43, p 200.

39. Op. cit., p 199.

40. Op. cit., Vol 30, p 51.

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NATIONAL

OBKOM SECRETARY ON CADRES POLICY

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 4, Feb 82 pp 28-33

[Article by V. Marisov, first secretary of the Udmurtskiy Obkom of the CPSU: "The Selection, Placement and Training of Leading Cadres"]

[Text] In the realization of the plans for economic and social development, leading cadres play a role of considerable importance. The November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee obligated the party committees to strengthen party influence on economic life. In his speech at the Plenum, comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "We have a right to expect that the Central Committees of the communist parties of the union republics, the kray, oblast, city and rayon committees of the party, on the basis of the great and diverse experience of the leadership of the economy, will significantly increase their influence on economic life. We are not talking here about petty tutelage, about the substitution of Soviet and economic organs. We are talking about something else--about a thoughtful and strict cadres policy, about persistence and clearness of purpose in the defense of state interests, and about a decisive struggle against every violation of the decisions that have been taken, but in particular of Soviet laws, and against every violation of party and communist ethics."

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Work of the Udmurtskiy Obkom of the CPSU with Respect to the Selection, Placement and Training of Leading Cadres" has become a concrete, long-term program for our republic. The Central Committee proposed to the party obkom that it safeguard the strict observance of the Leninist principles of work with cadres in all party, soviet, economic organs and public organizations, that it increase their responsibility for the selection and training of workers, their training and retraining, and the creation of a reserve.

In organizing the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee decree, the party obkom is trying to achieve that our cadres give up work after the old fashion, that they constantly make a critical assessment of what has been achieved, and that they measure it by the demands of the time. In perfecting the style and methods of work with cadres, we are trying to get every soviet and economic leader in the Udmurtskaya Autonomous Republic to guarantee the fulfillment of the fulfillment of the plans and targets, to be fully responsible for the section of work entrusted to them, and to be distinguished by a high degree of principledness and moral purity. The Obkom, the gorkoms and raykoms of the party increased their attention to the

ideological tempering of cadres, the broadening of their general horizon, and the perfection of their business qualifications.

There is reason to assert that in the republic, as well as throughout the country, good circumstances have been created for well-organized work. Cadres of different nationalities are working amicably in the collectives. There has been a notable increase in the personnel of executives, skilled workers, and the engineering-technical and creative intelligentsia from the indigenous population.

Working as a single family, the toilers of industry and construction of the republic secured the overfulfillment of the plans and targets of the last year of the 10th Five-Year-Plan and the first year of the 11th Five-Year-Plan.

Concern for the strict observance of Leninist principles of work with cadres made it possible for us to attain improvements in the qualitative composition of the workers of all categories. In particular, 85 percent of the workers falling under the nomenklatura of the party obkom have a higher education. The remaining workers not having this education are studying in various educational institutions.

Principal significance in the republic is being attached to the work with cadres of the party apparatus. The CPSU obkom is concerned about raising the level of training of the workers of this category. Of the 99 secretaries at the raykom and gor-kom level of the party, 96 have a higher education, including 55 percent who are specialists in industry and agriculture. Guided by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the party obkom is trying to raise the political training of people who come into the party apparatus from production and is helping them to acquire the necessary habits of party activity.

Now we are working to create a situation where in every responsible section there is not simply a worker at work who has a diploma, but a genuinely highly-qualified specialist with a high sense of responsibility--responsibility to the people he is trusted to direct, to the party and the people as a whole. These requirements are met by the overwhelming majority of executives of the production associations and enterprises of the basic sectors of the national economy, ministries and departments of the republic.

At the same time, as the facts show, still not all executives in the republic serve as a model of discipline and the fulfillment of official and public duties. Some of them abuse trust, work in a lax fashion, and have become used to explaining shortcomings on the basis of "objective reasons".

Previously such executives were frequently dismissed from criticism in the primary party organizations and work collectives; their misdemeanors were reviewed only in the higher party organs. Moreover, the worker who messed things up and compromised himself frequently was again set up in an executive position. After the decree of the CPSU Central Committee we took steps to put an end to this practice. The primary party organizations, in exercising control over the activity of the administration, began to hold the leaders of industry more strictly responsible for how cost accounting is strengthened in every section, how the mechanization and automation of production processes are being put into practice, how advanced experience, progressive methods of labor organization and a complex system of quality control

are realized, how carefully and economically metals, fuel and electric power are expended. Party organizations are subjecting executive personnel to more exacting demands with respect to the increase of organization and discipline in production, the education of the workers, and the strict observance of socialist legality and public order. The primary party organizations and party committees are making sharp, principled assessments of those who tolerate facts deceiving the state, abuse their official position, and conduct themselves incorrectly in private life. Those executives who fail to cope or compromise themselves must be replaced.

The work performed, of course, is only part of the matter. We still see cases of neglect and serious shortcomings in the selection, placement and training of cadres, above all in the light, food, and local industry, in trade and everyday services. These are important sectors, whose workers carry great responsibility for the practical realization of the broad program of social measures outlined by the party and for the satisfaction of the daily needs and growing requirements of the workers. But, unfortunately, it is precisely in these sectors that a part of the executives have not yet acquired the necessary political and business qualities. In recent times a gap has been discovered in the recruitment of cadres of the administrative organs of the republic as well. The relevant party organizations are oriented towards overcoming the serious shortcomings. Control over the execution is exercised by the secretariat of the CPSU obkom.

Difficult tasks fell to the lot of the cadres working in agriculture. The exceptional drought of 1981 greatly complicated the work of the executives of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, rural rayon party committees, and the executive committees of rayon soviets of people's deputies and local agricultural organs. Taking the situation into account, the party organs put emphasis on the development of the initiative of cadres and pointed farm directors and work collectives in the direction of searching for additional reserves.

The past year became a serious test of maturity for the executive personnel and all toilers of the village. Foreseeing that the coarse fodders produced locally in the republic will be insufficient, the party committees helped the machine operators and the agronomists to assimilate the advanced experience of harvesting the straw of rye from the field and pointed people towards gathering and bringing to the farms everything they succeeded in growing. A proprietary approach was manifested by executive personnel, the toilers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes also at the time of the harvest of the spring and fodder crops, potatoes and vegetables. In this way the difficulties were met with organization.

The large tasks set before the communists of Udmurtiya compelled us to devote special attention to the strengthening of cadres of the state apparatus. The practice of sending specialists with experience in party and soviet work to republican organs has fully justified itself. Now capable and authoritative executives work here.

In the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of the Udmurtskiy Obkom of the CPSU with Respect to the Selection, Placement and Training of Leading Cadres", it was noted that there are no women in the republic who are chairmen of the executive committees of city and rayon soviets, and few of them are in execu-

tive positions in industry, construction and agriculture. Now that two years have passed it can be said that the state of affairs has begun to change. In the nomenklatura of positions of the rayon and city committees of the party, women account for one third. And in the nomenklatura of the obkom women constitute approximately 12 percent. Svetlana Timofeyevna Simakova and Margarita Aleksandrovna Shatrova work as chairmen of the executive committees of two rural rayons.

Many women are successfully heading different sections of agricultural production. Among them, for example, may be named the chief agronomist of the Kolkhoz imeni Michurin of the Balezinskiy Rayon, Valentina Ivanovna Ushakova. She is distinguished by the aspiration to work together with the party organization and the collective, by the ability to secure the support of people, their knowledge and experience. During the 10th Five-Year-Plan the plan for selling grain to the state was fulfilled to the extent of 146 percent, flax seed--206 percent, flax fiber--240 percent, vegetables--126 percent, milk--104.8 percent, and meat--100.7 percent. Profits amounting to 2.8 million rubles were obtained. If the average grain yield in the Balezinskiy Rayon in 1981 came to 9.4 quintals per hectare, the harvest in the Kolkhoz imeni Michurin was 17.7 quintals.

However, it must be acknowledged that the CPSU obkom still does not do everything to advance women to executive posts. We must seriously work at this problem in order to fulfill the corresponding directives of the 26th CPSU Congress.

In organizing the elimination of shortcomings in the work with cadres, we proceed from the Leninist requirement that in the interests of the cause it is necessary to increase constantly the theoretical and political training of party, soviet, economic and other categories of executives. Therefore, the oblast committee of the party attaches primary significance to the study of cadres, to the development, on their part, of the necessary political qualities. The party committees and party organizations, in every conceivable way, are raising the responsibility of cadres for the state of educational work, for the moral and psychological climate in the work collectives. We seek to attain that executives consider communist education and the daily work with people as the most important component part of their activity, as a necessary condition for the successful solution of all tasks.

Systematic studies have been organized for the responsible officials of the obkom apparatus of the party. In the course of studies, for example, problems of the work of party committees with cadres, as well as the organization of control and the verification of execution, are examined. Great interest on the part of the workers of the apparatus was called forth by a detailed discussion of the subject of the development of a comprehensive plan of organizational party work with respect to the fulfillment of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. In so doing it was underscored that the main thing is to strengthen party influence on production through work with cadres.

During the past two years, 240 party and soviet workers have gone through retraining in inter-oblast courses under the auspices of the Sverdlovsk Higher Party School and more than 1,000 individuals studied in courses under the auspices of the party obkom. Sixty-one individuals were sent for studies in the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU Central Committee and to higher party schools.

More than 11,000 elected party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol activists are studying in universities of Marxism-Leninism, in city and rayon schools for the party and operational aktiv. The students are regularly addressed by secretaries of the obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms of the party, by leading workers of the republic party, soviet and economic organs. Specialists of the national economy are increasing their knowledge on the basis of the Udmurtskiy State University, the Izhevskiy Mechanical Institute, and the Udmurtskaya School for the Administration of Agriculture. By decision of the bureau of the CPSU obkom studies were organized for executive personnel going into the nomenklatura of the party obkom. Groups are organized taking into account the character of the practical activity of the workers. During the 1981-1982 academic year they will study the course "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on Economy and Thrift."

The party committees of the republic have begun to make executives of all levels more responsible for the state of educational work in the collectives and to draw them more actively into direct participation in political and ideological activity. On the United Political Day more than 800 executives speak every month in Izhevsk. Executives of enterprises and organizations, as well as large plants, account for 52 percent of the propagandists of the network of party education.

We have certain positive results in the increase of the educational role of party meetings, sessions of the bureau, committees and plenums. We are being guided by the instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress concerning the fact that the party meeting, as well as the plenum of any party committee is a place where all vital questions must be thoroughly and seriously discussed. At plenums, sessions of the bureaus of party committees, and meetings of communists, the activity of executive workers are regularly subjected to detailed and comprehensive analysis and is given a fundamentally objective assessment. Party committees fight for increasing the quality of all measures being carried out, for the development of criticism and self-criticism, and develop in communists an implacable attitude towards shortcomings.

The meeting of the party aktiv of the republic, which was devoted to the results of the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the tasks of the Udmurtskaya Oblast party organization emanating from the speech of comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, took place in the spirit of high demands and exactingness. The main thought expressed in the report and the speeches at the meeting of the party aktiv was that the answer to the decision of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee must be a high degree of organization, efficiency, discipline, and a good practical result.

During the 11th Five-Year-Plan the workers of the republic are faced with the fulfillment of difficult tasks, above all with respect to the building up of the contribution to the solution of the food program. It is planned for the kolkhozes and sovkhoses to increase the average annual harvest of grain during the five years by 139,000 tons, potatoes--by 32,000 tons, vegetables--by 24,000 tons. The production of meat will have to be increased by 16,000 tons (in live weight), milk--by 48,000 tons, and eggs--by 48 million units. Industry, too, faces large tasks.

In order to cope successfully with the program of development of the national economy, the utmost concentration and the maximum use of existing possibilities are required of executives, as well as carefully thought-out organizational and political activity among the masses. Unfortunately, the level of work of a number of executives up to now does not meet the stated requirements. At a meeting of the party aktiv, the style of cadres work of the Alnashskiy Raykom of the party and its first secretary, A. G. Polyakov, was subjected to serious criticism. Dedication to high party principles and standards are missing in the activity of the bureau of this raykom of the party. Instead of painstaking and thoughtful work with cadres and a considerate attitude towards them, their frequent removability is being allowed. Thus, during the past five years three chairmen of the rayon executive committee were dismissed, as were nine of fourteen kolkhoz chairmen, almost all of the secretaries of primary party organizations of farms, and the chairmen of rural soviets. From the very outset, beginning executives did not receive concrete help and support. Comrade Polyakov was inconsistent in his actions, did not listen to the opinion of the party aktiv, assessed the shortcomings in his work uncritically --for which he was relieved of his position.

The meeting of the party aktiv emphasized unanimously that increasing demands to the level of the work of cadres and their responsibility is for us a primary task. And above all responsibility for the fulfillment of state plans and for educational work in the collectives.

The party committees of the oblast are showing great concern for the improvement of the selection, placement and training of ideological cadres, and persistently try to achieve that politically mature workers, capable of taking the initiative and having the necessary theoretical and professional training, are found in all sections of the ideological front. The ideological cadres are confronted with the task of consistently strengthening the link between propaganda and life, increasing the effectiveness of propaganda, its timeliness, and its offensive character in the struggle with bourgeois ideology. The question is to attain, in conformity with the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress, in reality the unity of the ideological-theoretical, political-educational, organizational and economic work of the party.

We regard the education and training of the coming generation as one of the most important sectors. The level of training of tomorrow's generation of cadres, including executive personnel, depends on how things go here. In turn, this depends on the people who today organize the work of the pedagogical collectives, above all the directors of the schools. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the directors meet the demands of today. At the same time, the great removability of this category of cadres called forth a certain concern. In some pedagogical collectives an unhealthy situation has been created. Having uncovered shortcomings in the schools, workers of the ministry of education did not take an active part in their elimination. The bureau of the CPSU obkom listened to the report of the minister of education of the republic, I. P. Tukayev on the work of the Ministry of Education of the Udmurtskaya ASSR with the directors of schools. In the decree that was adopted it was recommended to the ministry to take concrete measures in regard to the improvement of the work with school directors. The state of affairs in regard to cadres in the sphere of education has begun to correct itself.

In connection with the fact that in the new five-year-plan the brigade method of the organization and payment of work must become basic, the oblast committee of the party attaches great significance to the quantitative and qualitative growth of a large detachment of leaders of this lower link. A seminar-meeting of brigade leaders took place in the republic. We expect, and the first experience acquired confirms, that the development of brigade forms of organization and payment of labor will allow solving questions of the development of production and the education of workers more successfully. Today more than 55 percent of the workers are working in brigades.

During the 1980's a thrifty, economical attitude towards labor resources acquires special significance. In conditions of growing demands of production, its intensification, and the reduction in the growth of labor resources, executives are called upon to make capable decisions regarding questions of the training of highly-qualified workers, to show in this respect a certain perseverance and purposefulness. How important this is for the national economy, we felt especially acutely at the beginning of the 11th Five-Year-Plan when we noted a certain increase in the number of enterprises of construction, transportation and agriculture which failed to cope with the tasks.

This is what determined the agenda of the plenum of the party obkom held recently, which discussed the tasks of party organizations in regard to the improvement of the training of the work force of the republic. Proposals were introduced at the plenum for better organizing the work of schools and colleges for professional-technical education, for enlarging the knowledge of engineering and pedagogical personnel and masters. During the 11th Five-Year-Plan, through the system of professional-technical colleges alone, we must train more than 64,000 individuals, including approximately 20,800 for agricultural production. The plenum determined what party committees and primary party organizations must do in the training of the work force.

There are serious shortcomings in the work with the executives of public organizations. The executives of a number of trade union and Komsomol organs, people's control and other public organizations do not have sufficient initiative at times and show a kind of sluggishness. Another trade union worker, instead of independent actions, expends a mass of time on the agreement of questions, hoping in this way to take away the responsibility for their solution from himself.

The party organizations are called upon to develop in every possible way the independence of public organizations and their executives, to support their initiative, and to hold communists working in elected organs strictly responsible.

A patient and attentive attitude towards the executives of the Komsomol and trade union always produces good fruit. The obkom, city and rayon committees of the party, plant committees, and primary party organizations are devoting a lot of attention to the training of trade union workers and secretaries of Komsomol committees. As a result of the work that has been done, all of the chairmen and three fourths of the secretaries of the oblast trade union committees now have a higher education. More than 60 percent of the full-time trade union workers of the oblast, city and rayon link are specialists of the national economy and have experience in working with people.

The process of reinforcing the executive organs of the oblast Komsomol organization with communists is proceeding. Young communists are heading more than 60 percent of the primary and approximately 30 percent of the plant Komsomol organizations. As a rule, all secretaries of the raykom and gorkom All-Union Lenin Young Communist League have a higher education.

Among the chairmen of the committees of people's control 82 percent are people with a higher education at the present time, more than 42 percent are specialists of various sectors of production.

There has been an increase in the role of the gorkoms and raykoms of the party in the daily purposeful work with cadres. They learn to know cadres in practical affairs, identify the more capable organizers and, together with the primary party organizations, recommend them for executive positions. The party organizations show special concern for the mastery of the Leninist style of work by the cadres and for an increase in the responsibility of executives for the work sector entrusted to them.

The creation of a dependable reserve of cadres, as the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized, was and remains an important task. Constant work is being done with those who are included in the reserve. The party committees give them missions whose execution makes possible a better identification of their abilities, the accumulation of experience that will prove useful in the future, and the teaching of the successful combination of production and public activity. In perfecting the forms and methods of work with the reserve of cadres, the obkom, gorkoms and raykoms of the party have begun to give greater consideration in the promotion of workers to the opinion of party organizations and work collectives. Promising people who have proved themselves are promoted from among those included in the reserve to executive positions. Of definite benefit is the practice that has come into being of the probationary work of young cadres and their certification.

Assessing what has been done, it may be said that the obkom of the party and the party committees and organizations of our oblast have still not carried out cadres work in all sectors and in all directions in conformity with the demands of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Work of the Udmurtskiy Obkom of the CPSU with Respect to the Selection, Placement and Training of Leading Cadres". The process of improving it, overcoming shortcomings, obsolete methods and habits is proceeding. In critically analyzing our experience, we see weak links in the training of cadres, in their organizational and political activity among workers. The party committees are concentrating their attention on the elimination of omissions and are purposefully looking for more effective ways and methods for overcoming them. If we speak about the shortcomings of the oblast, city and rayon committees of the party, the work with the cadres of enterprises that are lagging behind remains the weak spot. Frequently it is conducted in formal terms. The director is faced with tasks which he himself knows little about and general advice is given. But, indeed, the director, especially of a lagging sector, needs concrete assistance and effective recommendations as to how to bring about the elimination of a shortcoming or mistake.

The communists of the republic have developed the organizational and political work in regard to the mobilization of the workers for the fulfillment of the great tasks which emanate from the decisions of the 26th Congress of the party and the November Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Strict observance of Leninist principles of the selection, placement and training of executives will make it possible for our cadres to solve more successfully the tasks set before the republic in the 11th Five-Year-Plan.

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VOSLENSKY INTERVIEWED ON SUCCESSION STRUGGLE

Vienna PROFIL in German 19 Apr 82 pp 42-44

[Interview with Prof Michail Voslensky by Wilfried Ahrens on the power struggle in the Kremlin:* "Rescue of Russia Through KGB and Army?"; date and place not specified]

[Text] PROFIL: During the past few weeks the signs of a power struggle in the Kremlin are increasing. The final period of the Brezhnev era has been submerged in the twilight of rumors of death through poisoning and corruption. In Leningrad a malicious satire appears in which the death of Brezhnev, in hardly concealed manner, is celebrated in anticipation as a joyful event. In Moscow a play with an implicit political message is staged. On the stock exchange of Kremlinology different stars in the Politbureau are traded for the Brezhnev succession. What is really going on?

VOSLENSKY: One must separate hard facts from rumors.

PROFIL: There are rumors, for example, about the arrests of people who were closely linked with Brezhnev's daughter Galina and were involved in black market affairs with furs, luxury items and diamonds.

VOSLENSKY: Diamonds are now--this by the way--a popular symbol of status possession in the upper nomenklatura ranks. But all of this is much less interesting than the hard fact behind it: The source of the rumors.

PROFIL: Who is spreading them?

VOSLENSKY: That is the point. Official contact people of Western correspondents, but especially the Soviet personnel in Western embassies in Moscow, service personnel from the cleaning woman and the cook to the driver.

PROFIL: KGB people?

*)The Soviet historian Michail Voslensky has been living in the West since 1972. Since 1976 he has been an Austrian citizen. He directs the Institute for the Soviet Present in Munich. His standard work on the Soviet ruling class, "Nomenklatura" (Molden Verlag, 1980) has in the meantime been translated into five languages.

VOSLENSKY: Officially they are sent by the UpDK, the Administration for Servicing the Diplomatic Corps. Formally the UpDK is an independent administrative authority [it is formally subordinated to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs], but it is an open secret that it is subordinated to the KGB.

PROFIL: So the KGB is spreading rumors detracting from the prestige of Brezhnev and his entourage.

VOSLENSKY: This is how it looks in any case. Another tangible fact is the story of the obituary for Tsvigun. . . .

PROFIL: . . . the deputy KGB chief, who supposedly pushed forward the investigations and arrests of the various corruption affairs and who on 19 January died at the age of 64, officially "after long and severe illness"; according to a rumor, he took poison.

VOSLENSKY: This top man of the nomenklatura, powerful deputy chief of the KGB, and brother-in-law of Brezhnev, dies. And his obituary is signed--from the Politbureau--only by KGB chief Andropov, Minister of Defense Ustinov, Chernenko, whom we must discuss in more detail, and the youngest Politbureau member, the 51-year-old Gorbachev, who as secretary of the Central Committee is responsible for agriculture, with which Tsvigun really had nothing to do.

PROFIL: The interpretation of such protocol events belongs to the frequently smiled-at standard instruments of Western Kremlinologists. Does this yield anything?

VOSLENSKY: I do not think much of Kremlinology, but it is revealing to analyze anomalies which surface now and then in Soviet political life. For this political life is very strictly regulated. If a rule is circumvented or not taken into account, this is never accidental, but always has a concrete political meaning, surely also in this case with the strange list of given and refused signatures under the Tsvigun obituary in PRAVDA of 21 January. Let us compare the Tsvigun obituary with another obituary in PRAVDA of 11 March for the musician Leonid Utesov. He was a jazz conductor, director of the Variety Orchestra of the RSFSR--in other words, not exactly a significant man of the top leadership. Utesov was not even a member of the party. But his obituary is signed by Brezhnev, Prime Minister Tikhonov, Chernenko and Grishin, Politbureau member and party chief in Moscow. It is also signed by Kapitonov, who in the Central Committee is responsible for Tsvigun's KGB, but not for light music. Interesting that Andropov and Ustinov did not sign, who had put their name under Tsvigun's obituary--one wonders whether that was not a demonstrative refusal.

PROFIL: Because the fact of the signatures by prominent leaders for the musician is to be assessed as a further subsequent degradation of the KGB man Tsvigun?

VOSLENSKY: One can probably see it this way, especially if one considers that it was not even announced where Tsvigun is buried. He actually could have been buried along the Kremlin wall, but he was not even buried in the Novodevichiy Cemetery, the cemetery for the prominent members of the nomenklatura. Without selling oneself to Kremlinology, one can deduce the following messages from the whole story: The

powerful vice chief of the KGB is portrayed as a man who, in the eyes of the highest leadership of the Soviet Union, conducted himself in such a bad manner that he is not granted the honors which are appropriate to his rank. Secondly, a part of the leadership in an equally demonstrative fashion takes his part and separates itself in an again clearly recognizable manner from the majority group on the next occasion--the obituary for a politically insignificant man.

PROFIL: The distribution of obituary signatures as a symptom for the power struggle between two groups?

VOSLENSKY: Of course, this sounds strange to the Western ear. But: The signature of Gorbachev is an unmistakable sign for the fact that the signing did not place according to formal membership in the armed forces, but according to membership of a group. Again: Gorbachev is responsible for agriculture, for the three catastrophic bad harvests in a row. He must take into account that he will be held responsible for this. Moreover, history shows that it is precisely the youngest members of the Soviet top leadership who are preferably removed, not the older ones. One can conjecture that Gorbachev is now seeking support from Andropov and Ustinov.

PROFIL: If we are dealing with a power struggle--how, then, does the front line up? And who are the candidates of the respective groups?

VOSLENSKY: The fronts in the Soviet leadership normally run between two groups. On the one side stands the group of the incumbent general secretary, at present the Brezhnev group in other words. It consists of people whom he has brought into the Politbureau or into the Secretariat of the Central Committee. On the other side stands the group of those who were already in the top leadership before he came to power, the group of independents.

PROFIL: Andropov and Ustinov?

VOSLENSKY: Both belong to the group of the independents. Andropov was already secretary of the Central Committee under Khrushchev. And Ustinov became one of the leaders of the military-industrial complex already under Stalin--more than 40 years ago.

PROFIL: The dominant group unquestionably is the Brezhnev group. And it has after all clearly brought to prominence its preferred man for the Brezhnev succession: Konstantin Chernenko.

VOSLENSKY: Chernenko is, indeed, the candidate of the Brezhnev group. In this capacity, by the way, he was here in Vienna at the SALT-II negotiations between Carter and Brezhnev--as the taciturn guarantor of the continuity of Soviet policy.

PROFIL: Chernenko made career under and through Brezhnev. Does he have any abilities or merits other than the protection of the general secretary?

VOSLENSKY: He is a perfect chief of chancery. When Brezhnev became first secretary of the Central Committee in 1965 [sic! Should be: 1964], he appointed Chernenko as head of the General Department of the Central Committee. This out-

wardly modest post he has not relinquished to the present day, even though he is in the meantime at the very top as second secretary of the Central Committee and Politbureau member.

PROFIL: What functions does this General Department have?

VOSLENSKY: It is the anteroom of the power apex. All petitions and proposals do not go directly to the leadership bodies, but are screened and selected in the General Department. The entire decision-making of the Politbureau and the Central Committee Secretariat is serviced by the General Department, and all decisions are transmitted by it to the appropriate authorities. That is a very influential position. Under Stalin Malenkov had a similar position and he became the designated successor of Stalin not least of all because of this position.

PROFIL: The fate of Malenkov, however, will not exactly be an inviting model for Chernenko.

VOSLENSKY: There are in general certain parallels between Malenkov and Chernenko. Malenkov was an extraordinarily gifted--I would almost say: ingenious--chief of chancery and manager of the party apparatus. It was an unimaginable performance that he eliminated and liquidated Beriya. . . .

PROFIL: . . . Stalin's secret police chief.

VOSLENSKY: At that time, Beriya as the ruler over Stalin's police apparatus with its gigantic power, was firmly convinced that he had the entire leadership after Stalin's death firmly in his control. For this reason he was not in a hurry to liquidate his, as he thought, helpless rivals. And that Malenkov, whom Beriya already regarded as a little mouse in his hand, then destroyed him, was an unparalleled tactical performance.

PROFIL: Nevertheless: After less than two years Malenkov was sent into the wilderness by Khrushchev.

VOSLENSKY: Yes, and that is the point. Khrushchev, this provincial who was underestimated at the time by the others, had a decisive advantage over Malenkov. He had been first secretary in the Ukraine, he had the experience of a man at the top, the experience of the final decision. Malenkov had always been the second in command at the most, frequently he had even only played the third fiddle. He was a master of maneuvering in the apparatus--and not a ruler. Here is the parallel to Chernenko. Chernenko, too, has never had the experience of power at the top.

PROFIL: That can be a decisive structural weakness for a man at the top.

VOSLENSKY: That is a weakness. To be sure, Chernenko is profiting from it. For it is precisely because of this that they have chosen him for the Brezhnev succession. The members of the leadership do not want a strong, but a weak general secretary.

PROFIL: Is it because of this that Kirilenko, who was regarded as stronger and in the mid-1970's was still regarded as the "crownprince" of Brezhnev, was pushed back?

VOSLENSKY: In 1974, after Brezhnev's first illness, Kirilenko, as second in command, chaired the Politbureau sessions. But already the ascent of Suslov in the hierarchy went at the expense of Kirilenko. The reasons for this are still unknown. Kirilenko is responsible in the Politbureau for the party organization and the security apparatus. He is still a powerful man--but he has been pushed back.

PROFIL: Should he be the candidate of Andropov and Ustinov for the Brezhnev succession?

VOSLENSKY: The group of the independents in the leadership is a rather loose formation. One has the impression that up to now it does not openly build up its own candidate. Kirilenko is 76, older than Brezhnev. His election would obviously be the election of a transition candidate and not a solution in this sense.

PROFIL: Chernenko is 70.

VOSLENSKY: So he has another five years before he will be as old as the general secretary is today. He appears to offer himself as acceptable to both groups. Perhaps the fact that he signed with both groups points in this direction. He has made a turnabout in his--in the recent past numerous--statements. A few years ago, he advocated in articles a strengthening of discipline, in his new articles he speaks of the necessity to take into account, above all, the wishes of the population. His most recent book, published in December 1981, is called "The CPSU and Human Rights"--a subject that up to now has never been treated at this level. And here a whole book! In short, Chernenko does not act like the leader of a bellicose group out to defeat the others, but rather as a figure of compromise, of integration at the top of the nomenklatura. Perhaps he sees his chance of becoming the successor in this--without dramatic sharpening of the issues, which given this power constellation could not be entirely excluded.

PROFIL: You mean the Brezhnev succession could be connected with a policy change in the direction of liberalization of the system?

VOSLENSKY: The Brezhnev policy up to now was a policy of inflexibility, of immobility. But reforms in the USSR are urgently necessary, especially in the economy, if there are to be no catastrophes, rebellions, and strikes. The last attempt to make the Soviet economy more productive was undertaken in 1965 by Kosygin--on paper. It was quickly destroyed by the party apparatus.

PROFIL: Who, then, shall be the reformers of the post-Brezhnev era? Perhaps the powerful man of the military apparatus, Ustinov? Or KGB chief Andropov?

VOSLENSKY: This is not so illogical if we look at the individuals. Ustinov is a typical and efficient technocrat at the top of the more or less efficient armaments industry of the USSR. Here attempts are being made to work with incentives after all within the framework of the unproductive bureaucratic system. Andropov is regarded as an advocate of the Hungarian model. He was ambassador in Budapest in 1956. Subsequently he became the head of the department of the Central Committee which is responsible for relations with other Eastern bloc countries. Since then he is regarded as a protector of Kadar in Moscow. Interesting in this connection is the stage play you mentioned at the outset.

PROFIL: It is called: "This Is How We Shall Be Victorious!"

VOSLENSKY: Yes. In this demonstratively praised stage play, which was seen by the Politbureau, the plot turns around Lenin as the creator of the New Economic Policy. . . .

PROFIL: . . . through which elements of a capitalistic economy were again admitted, resulting in a sudden improvement of the supply situation. . . .

VOSLENSKY: . . . and which was then choked off by Stalin. But the play shows Lenin during the NEP period, how he dictates his political testament, in which he demands the removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary. And Lenin's speech at the 10th Party Congress serves as apotheosis--a speech in which he pleads for the NEP and exclaims: "Let us not deviate from this course! This is how we shall be victorious!" That is in the theater. In history Lenin, to be sure, was certainly not in favor of private capitalism, but he was also against total nationalization. From one of his last articles it is clearly apparent that he had in mind a cooperative economic model.

PROFIL: Even if one imputes such affable plans to Andropov and Ustinov of all people--to carry them out they would need more power than the top echelons of the state security service and the army have thus far in the history of the Soviet Union been granted. Their absolute subordination to the party was up to now an inviolable law.

VOSLENSKY: Consider from this point of view for once what happened in Poland. Perhaps Poland is today a political field of experimentation for a future power coalition in the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 1826/36

REGIONAL

ALL-UNION FILM FESTIVAL OPENS IN TALLINN

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 13 Apr 82 pp 1,3

[Article: "The Festival Is Open"]

[Text] Tallinn, the capitol of Estonia, was decorated with the flags of the 15 fraternal republics participating in the 15th All-Union Film Festival. This very large forum of Soviet film art, which has been dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is one of the outstanding festivals of the motherland's jubilee year.

The majority of the films, presented to the festival, reflect very important historical and contemporary events and depict the world-wide historical achievements of the fraternal Soviet people and their struggle to carry out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The ceremonial opening of the film festival took place on 12 April in the V. I. Lenin Palace of Culture and Sports. The hall was in holiday attire. A panel with V. I. Lenin's words on the film art and the festival's emblem decorated its stage. On the stage were members of the organizing committee, the festival's jury, and prominent figures in the country's film art -- actors, producers and script writers.

In the hall were Comrades K. Bayno, V. Klauson, L. Lentsman, R. Ristlaan, A. Ryuytel', A. B. Upsi, D. Visnapuu, M. Pedak, and L. Shishov; Yu. Afanas'yev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Cultural Section; M. Vannas, deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; B. Saul and G. Tynspoyeg, deputy chairmen of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers; V. Vakht, secretary of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; heads of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee sections; Estonian SSR ministers; directors of creative unions; and the foremost people in industry.

In opening the festive occasion, A. Gren, chairman of the organizing committee for the 15th All-Union Film Festival and deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, expressed the confidence that the present forum, which is taking place during the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, would play a large role in the further advance of the cinematographic art and would occupy an important place in the political and cultural life of the republic and of the entire country.

For Soviet film workers, festivals have become the main creative accounting of the USSR's multinational cinematographic art. The high civic enthusiasm and artistic maturity, which are peculiar to the best screen works, have made the movies the most popular mass form of art in our country. The skill of the film creators, who are working in the film studios of the fraternal republics, testifies to the inexhaustible opportunities for enriching the multinational Soviet culture and serves to strengthen the peoples' friendship. The creative bonds of the film studio collectives in the fraternal republics are getting stronger. In answer to the communist Party's concern, Soviet cinematographers are creating new and splendid works, engraving on the screen a chronicle of the glorious achievements of our contemporary--the builder of communism. Films, which summon one to the struggle for peace and for the happiness of all mankind, have acquired special resoundingness. The extensive program of the present festival is a witness to this fruitful work. In greeting the participants and guests of the 15th All-Union Film Festival, A. Gren wished that all the work days of the country's largest film forum be filled with interesting work, fruitful contacts between the film experts, and the happiness of encountering the best work of the Soviet screen.

The 15th All-Union Film Festival is declared open. The festival's flag is raised to the sounds of the USSR and the Estonian SSR national anthems.

F. Yermash, the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography, is given the floor. He relayed to the festival participants and guests and to all the workers in Soviet films the hearty greetings and good wishes of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, for further successes in their work and creativity. These were greeted with hearty applause.

The speaker cordially thanked Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the name of all the cinematographic art figures for his unflagging attention to and fartherly concern for Soviet cinematography and wished him good health and new achievements in his truly titanic work for the good of our country and in the defense of peace on earth.

F. Yermash further said that our festivals always take place as festive occasions of the unity of art and the people and as reviews of the achievements of Soviet films. During the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the festival is especially clearly revealing its importance as a review of the strength of our country's entire multinational cinematographic art.

In looking back over the 60-year journey, we can say with pride that the party has carried out the precept of great Lenin who considered the movies to be the most important of the arts and who dreamed about the flowering of a truly national film industry permeated with the ideas of communist creation.

In following Lenin's precepts, the communist party is purposefully directing the construction and development of artistic culture, including the mass art of the film industry.

Soviet cinematography is now drawing into itself everything that is valuable and of general significance in the achievements and traditions of the cultures of our country's peoples and it is clearly reflecting the Soviet way of life, its historical optimism and humanistic nature. Our country's cinematography has become the true spokesman of the spiritual ideals of its audience.

The film industry has walked beside its audience during all the period in the history of our state. It clearly gave a memorable description of the revolutionary exploit of the people, it depicted the heroic epic poem of socialist construction in unforgettable images, the film industry was alongside the soldiers of the Great Patriotic War. Even today, it is with those who are implementing the majestic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress with their work and talents.

Cinematography's movement is determined by the movement of history itself and it is justified that the model of a Soviet individual -- a communist -- is always at the center of attention of the cinematographers. The enthusiasm for the communist transformation of the world and the creative work of the people serve as the source for the creative ideas of the workers in the Soviet multinational film industry.

The speaker pointed out that one of the main accomplishments of Soviet cinematography, having historic meaning, is the fact that it is coming forward today as a single multinational cinematographic culture and as the first example in history of a free synthesis of national traditions within the unified framework of the socialist realism art.

During the first years of the Soviet state, far from all peoples had their own cinema. Today, a mature film culture has been formed in each union republic. The artistic wealth of our screen is being created by the collective work of the producers, script writers and artists in all the studios of our country.

All this is the historic result of implementing the Leninist nationality and cultural policy and the result of the influence of party thought, which unfailingly directed the attention of the artist towards an understanding of the deep conformities to law of the era of Great October, on the film art.

The spirit of searching has never deserted our cinema. Today, when we are preparing to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the appearance of the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Measures To Develop Soviet Cinematography Further," a bold creative search for new vital material and for new ways to express it and an active process to enrich traditions are taking place in our art form.

All the sections in our festival's program, which embrace the artistic, documentary, popular scientific, and animated cartoon film industry and films for children and teenagers, confirm the justice of these words.

During the days of the festival, it is planned not only to sum up results but also to think exactly about the future. Soviet cinematographers are still faced with doing a lot to depict the life of the people more fully and deeply on the screen so that each film industry work will be worthy of the age of developed socialism and worthy of its audience -- the builders of communism.

The All-Union Film Festival during the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR will undoubtedly provide new creative impulses to our multinational film art which is united in its ideological aspirations and which is multifaceted in its forms and internationalistic in spirit.

A. Karaganov, board secretary of the USSR Union of Cinematographers, greeted the festival participants in the name of the union.

A. Gren, chairman of the organizing committee presented the chairmen of the juries: for artistic films -- V. Baskakov, director of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Cinematography and doctor of art history sciences; for children's and youth films -- A. Aleksin, writer and film playwright; for animated cartoon films -- producer E. Tuganov; and for documentary and popular scientific films -- producer I. Geleyn.

A concert was held after the gala opening ceremony of the film festival.

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CSO: 1800/502

REGIONAL

FILM-FESTIVAL WINNERS NAMED AT CLOSING CEREMONIES

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 21 Apr 82 pp 1,3

[Article: "The Festival Says Goodbye to Tallinn"]

[Text] The 15th All-Union Film Festival was a large festive occasion of the multinational art of the Soviet peoples during the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. And here it has come to an end. The interesting program -- the viewings of the competing films and the cordial meetings of the cinematographers with the work collectives -- is behind us. All of its participants have many impressions, the main ones of which are feelings of friendship and brotherhood.

The ceremonial closing of the film festival was held on 20 April in the Tallinn Officers Club. The curtain is being raised. On the stage are members of the festival's organizing committee, the juries, representatives of the republic capital's public organizations, and masters of the screen.

A. Gren, chairman of the festival's organizing committee and deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, opens the gala ceremony.

He said that:

Each of the fraternal republics is constructing its own cinematography based on its national traditions and forms, is personifying its people's notion of beauty, and is rubbing shoulders with its audience in their native language. At the same time, the mutual understanding and enrichment of national cultures is being ever more clearly shown in the steady rise of cinematographic standards and in the expressiveness of its forms as a result of the wise Leninist nationality policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet State.

During the days of the festival, 197 meetings were held which more than 27,400 people visited. About 30,000 viewers attended the viewings of the competing films.

For all Soviet cinematographers, the all-union film festival was a festive occasion which enriched the Soviet film industry.

Next, A. Gren announced that film playwright Ye. Gabrilovich, a Hero of Socialist Labor and USSR people's artist, and producer S. Yutkevich, a Hero of Socialist

Labor and USSR people's artist, had been awarded a special prize on the decision of the republic organizing committee and the united jury for their consistent embodiment of historical, revolutionary and Leninist subjects on the screen.

The chairmen of the juries were given the floor. They pointed out that works which clearly reflected the present level of development of the Soviet multinational cinematographic art and which narrated the country's revolutionary history and its heroic present had made up the festival's program.

A total of 23 artistic full-length films, which had been created by 19 of the country's film studios, were represented at the festival.

The jury decided to award the chief prize to an artistic film entitled "People in a Swamp" which was produced by producer V. Turov ("Belarus'fil'm"); a special prize to the "Mosfil'm" and "Mongolkino" film studios for the production of the film entitled "Across the Gobi and Khingan"; and prizes for an artistic film to the creative collective of the film "Yaroslav the Wise" (A. Dovzhenko Film Studio, for the best debut as a producer to P. Simm, the producer of the film "What Are You Sowing..." ("Tallinfil'm"), for the best film producer to V. Mel'nikov, the producer-director of the film "Two Lines of Small Print" ("Lenfil'm") and to the creative collective of the film "Daughter of a Horse-Thief" (the producer was A. Puypa, the operator -- A. Yangoras, and the artist -- F. Linchyute-Vaytekumene of the Lithuanian Film Studio -- for the best embodiment of national literary classics on the screen, to the creative collective of the film "Before a Closed Door" ("Azerbaydzhanfil'm")-- for developing moral and ethical questions, to the A. Dovzhenko Film Studio -- for its depiction of the Ukrainian people's struggle against bourgeois nationalism in the film "High Paths", and for his debut as a producer to T. Babluani, the producer of the film "Brother" ("Gruziya-fil'm"); a prize and certificate for the best film operator work to K. Ryzhov, operator for the film "Two Lines of Small Print" ("Lenfil'm"), a prize and certificate for the best female performance to actress Ye. Borzovaya in the film "People in a Swamp" ("Belarus'fil'm"); a prize and certificate for the best female performance to actress N. Ozhelita in the film "Daughter of a Horse-Thief" (Lithuanian Film Studio); a prize and certificate for the best male performance to actor A. Kukumyagi in the film "What Are You Sowing..." ("Tallinfil'm"); and a prize and certificate for the best male performance to actor S. Chokmorov in the film "Men Without Women" ("Kirgizfil'm").

The jury reviewed 46 documentary and 12 popular scientific films which were presented to the competition by 30 of the country's film studios.

In the category of documentary films, it was decided to award: first prizes -- to the creative collective of the film "Army Commanders of Industry" (Ukrainian Documentary Film Studio and to the creative collective of the film "The Time Is Not Imperious" (Georgian Popular Scientific and Documentary Film Studio); second prizes to the creative collective of the film "If You Deceive the Field..." ("Tallinfil'm") and to the creative collective of the film "The 96th Autumn" ("Belarus'film"); and prizes to the creative collective of the film "People Of God-Forsaken Holes" (Sverdlovskaya Film Studio) for the poetic story about the continuity of traditions and people of selfless work, to the creative collective

of the film "Pain" (the Uzbekistan Popular Scientific and Documentary Film Studio) for the best reporting, and to the creative collective of the film "Bread-Salt" (Central Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner Documentary Film Studio) for its vivid portrayal of the beauty of work.

In the category of popular scientific films, it was decided to award: first prize -- to the creative collective of the film "Journey to Accuracy" ("Tsentr Nauch-film"); second prize -- to the creative collective of the film "Arteries of Life" ("Kiyevnauchfil'm"); and a prize -- to the scenario author and producer of the film "About a White Bull-Calf", S. Strakhov (Georgian Popular Scientific and Documentary Film Studio), for the original author's handling of the subject.

In the category of films for children and youth, the jury decided to award: first prizes to the creative collective of the film "Childhood Holidays" (M. Gor'kiy Film Studio) and to the creative collective of the film "The Night Is Short" (A. Dovzhenko Film Studio; second prizes -- to the creative collective of the film "Papa Will Return" ("Turkmenfil'm"), to the creative collective of the film "Gikor" ("Armenfil'm") and to the creative collective of the "Medley" children's humorous newsreel Nos 29 and 30 (M. Gor'kiy Film Studio); and a special prize for the best story of the movie festival to the creative collective of the film "Mariya, Mirabela" ("Moldova-film", "Soyuzmul'tfilm" and "Romaniya-film" of Romania Film Studios).

The jury reviewed 17 animated cartoon films which were presented by 12 of the country's film studios.

The jury decided not to award a first prize; second prizes were awarded to the creative collective of the film "Several Exercises For Independent Life" ("Tallin-fil'm") and to the "Soyuzmul'tfilm" Film Studio for the program of films: "Bibigon", "Ivashka From the Pioneer Palace", "The Secret of the Third Planet", "A Tiger Cub on a Sunflower" and "Caliph-Stork".

USSR Ministry of Defense, AUCCTU, Komsomol Central Committee and other public organization prizes were also awarded.

B. Pavlenok, first deputy chairman of the festival's organizing committee and deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Cinematography, addressed the assembled people. He said that:

The festival which had begun its journey in the city of Lenin, had again come to the shores of the Baltic, to the land of Estonia, during the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. About 50 artists and collectives were holders of official prizes and certificates and a number of works had been singled out with prizes from public organizations. At first glance, this seems excessively liberal, however, let us recall that the creators of more than 150 artistic films, about 100 animated cartoon films and 500 documentary and popular scientific films rushed to the festival. Let us remember that the achievements of the cultures of 15 equal and sovereign union republics, of a number of autonomous republics, and almost 40 film studios were presented on the Tallinn screen during these days.

Permit me to express our thanks to the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, and to all the workers of Estonia for their cordiality and hospitality.

The flag of the 15th All-Union film festival was solemnly lowered.

In the name of the organizing committee A. Gren declared the festival closed.

The national anthems of the USSR and the Estonian SSR sounded.

Comrades K. Vayno, I. Kebin, O. Merimaa, A. Ryuytel', D. Visnapuu, M. Pedak, and L. Shishov; deputy chairmen of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers Kh. Vel'di and B. Saul; and others participated in the festive ceremony.

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On the occasion of the film festival's closing, its organizing committee arranged a reception for the guests and the participants.

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